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Abstract 
This study examines the effect of voluntary disclosure on corporate debt maturity and 
the role of ownership structure in this effect. For a sample of 440 French listed firms from 
2007 to 2013, the empirical results indicate that firms with greater voluntary disclosure have 
more long-term debt, suggesting that companies benefit from extensive disclosure through 
greater access to long-maturity debt. This finding is consistent with the evidence that 
voluntary disclosure provides an efficient monitoring mechanism in firms where long-term 
debt could insulate firms from lender scrutiny for long periods. The results also show that 
the positive association between voluntary disclosure and long-term debt is relevant only 
when the control rights of the controlling shareholders are significantly in excess of cash-flow 
rights. This finding supports recent work showing that better disclosure policies are viewed 
more positively by the market in environments where the risk of wealth expropriation by 
dominant shareholders is higher. 
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1. Introduction 
A long line of research documents the importance of agency and information 
asymmetry problems in the design of debt covenants (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2010; 
Christensen et al., 2016; Diamond, 1991).1 However, how these problems affect the choice 
between short- and long-term debt remains unclear. Some empirical studies show that firms 
issue more short-term debt in the presence of efficient governance mechanisms, such as high 
levels of managerial ownership (Datta et al., 2005), strong boards of directors (Harford et al., 
2008), or high contestability of the largest shareholder's control (Ben-Nasr et al., 2015). Other 
work provides evidence that debt maturities are longer in firms with a better information and 
monitoring environment, such as one with a higher quality of financial reporting (Bharath et 
al., 2008; García-Teruel et al., 2010) or stronger external audits (El Ghoul et al., 2016). 
The present study extends this line of research by examining the effect of voluntary 
disclosure on debt maturity structure. This topic is particularly salient but underexplored in 
firms that predominantly feature concentrated control, such as French firms. It is surprising 
that this issue has received such scant research attention, given that agency problems arising 
from concentrated control are dominant in most countries, as argued by La Porta et al. (2002). 
Indeed, unlike agency problems between shareholders and managers in dispersed ownership 
firms (Type I agency problems), central agency problems in firms with concentrated control 
arise from the likelihood of controlling shareholders—who are insiders in this environment—
expropriating minority shareholders and creditors (Type II agency problems).  
France provides an excellent laboratory-style setting for studying excess control 
rights, given the ubiquitous use by French firms of patterns that create a divergence between 
control rights and cash-flow rights. Indeed, French corporate law allows faithful shareholders 
(generally the largest shareholders) to be granted a second vote when they hold registered shares 
beyond a given period. The implementation of double voting rights can be introduced in the 
                                                          
1 The agency costs of debt can take different forms. For example, firms may invest in high-risk-high-return 
projects from which shareholders can benefit handsomely while debtholders would bear most of the cost. 
Firms can also engage in underinvestment—by undergoing profitable projects—while most of the 
generated cash flows will be used to pay the debt service. In addition, insiders may pursue short-term 
capital gains by selecting short-term investment projects at the expense of long-term projects with high net 
present value (Jensen and Meckling,1976). 
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articles of incorporation or in the by-laws (Lannoo, 1999).2 French firms are also allowed to 
create non-voting shares (e.g., preferred shares and investment certificates) that give priority 
in dividends over other types of shares while being deprived of the right of vote. The corporate 
law generally limits the issuance of nonvoting shares to a relatively small proportion of total 
equity capital.3 Further, it is common for a shareholder to hold an entity through a cascade 
of listed and unlisted intermediate firms (i.e., pyramid structures), allowing the shareholder 
to have substantial control over this entity while holding much less equity (Boubaker, 2007). 
This setting is even more interesting when we consider that France is a civil-law country, 
which, contrary to common-law countries, provides little protection to minority investors 
and poor law enforcement, making controlling shareholders more likely to engage in self-
dealing behavior (Djankov et al., 2008). Moreover, the literature on debt maturity is largely 
conducted with data from the United States, which is a common-law country with a capital 
market-oriented economy that provides a strong protection of creditor rights (La Porta et al., 
1997). France—a bank-oriented economy—offers, however, rather poor protection for 
creditors and exposes lenders to high credit risk (Davydenko and Franks, 2008), making it 
interesting to understand corporate debt maturity structure in such an environment.4,5 
Building on the premise that extensive voluntary disclosure is valuable to market 
participants, especially lenders, we argue that firms can obtain better access to long-term debt 
when they demonstrate greater voluntary disclosure.6 Indeed, increased voluntary disclosure 
sends a positive signal to the market because it is generally associated with decreased 
                                                          
2 These shares are not allowed to be traded on the stock exchanges or they would be deprived of the second 
vote. 
3 Examples of these firms are Bouygues, Casino Guichard, Essilor, Legrand, L’Oreal, Pechiney, Sagem, 
and Société du Louvre. 
4 France receives the score of 0 according the creditor rights index of La Porta et al. (1997) that ranges from 
a minimum of 0 to a maximum of four. 
5 The authors contend that the French bankruptcy law is “creditor unfriendly” and explain that:  
French bankruptcy courts are given control of the bankruptcy process and are not mandated to sell firm assets 
to the highest bidder. The role of creditors is reduced to an advisory function, and their approval is not 
required by the court in determining a reorganization plan (p. 566). 
6 In relation to our topic pertaining to the information environment, it is more relevant to examine the 
maturity of the debt from the offer side. A voluntary disclosure environment would influence the behavior 
of market participants being more able to form an opinion of the firm risk, which is determinant in a 
lender's decision to extend credit to the firm (Cole, 1998). Moreover, there are two distinct parties to the 
implementation of each voluntary disclosure policy and lending policy—the firm and the lending entity, 
respectively—such that the decision to lend for a long or short period is a response to the firm’s observed 
disclosure strategy. Many papers adopt the offer side perspective when examining debt maturity such as 
Bharath et al., (2008), García-Teruel et al. (2010), and El Ghoul et al. (2016).  
4 
 
information asymmetry and better observability of insider actions (Bushman and Smith, 
2001; Chung et al., 2015; Lang and Lundholm, 2000). That is, lenders can protect their interests 
by relying on extensive voluntary disclosure as an effective monitoring device, which is 
reflected in the ability of firms to issue more long-term debt.  
Focusing on 440 French listed firms from 2007 to 2013, univariate analysis shows that 
the different voluntary disclosure variables are strongly positively correlated with debt 
maturity, suggesting that firms have more long-maturity debt when they voluntarily divulge 
a large amount of information. This positive association is substantiated by the results of 
multivariate analysis that accounts for the joint determination of debt maturity and leverage 
by estimating a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression.  
We sharpen our analysis by examining how the association between voluntary 
disclosure and debt maturity varies with the likelihood of controlling shareholders 
entrenching themselves due to their control rights in excess of cash-flow rights, that is, excess 
control rights.7 This inquiry is motivated by the very evidence from prior studies that 
controlling shareholders with excess control rights are inclined to misuse firm resources in 
pursuit of private benefits (e.g., Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010; Claessens et al., 2002; Johnson 
et al., 2000). In this context, firms with excess control rights typically exhibit greater corporate 
transparency to avoid unfavorable financing conditions and alleviate agency costs (Chung et 
al., 2015; Morris et al., 2011). We argue that the voluntary disclosure of these firms is more 
valuable to lenders because their greater transparency would facilitate information gathering 
and increase management monitoring to a greater extent, implying a stronger association 
between voluntary disclosure and long-term debt. 
Evidence from empirical analysis indicates that the positive disclosure effect on debt 
maturity is significant only for high levels of excess control rights. This means that greater 
entrenchment of dominant shareholders induces lenders to place more weight on voluntary 
disclosure in their decision to grant long-maturity debt. This argument lends credence to the 
contention that better disclosure policies are viewed more positively by the market in 
                                                          
7 Research in the French context (e.g., Boubaker, 2007; Faccio and Lang, 2002) documents the ubiquitous 
use of control-enhancing mechanisms such as double voting shares, nonvoting shares, and/or pyramiding 
structures.  
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environments with a higher risk of wealth expropriation by controlling shareholders. Our 
conclusions are robust to a set of sensitivity tests and endogeneity. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we significantly advance 
the debt-contracting literature by studying whether voluntary disclosure can substitute for 
short-term debt in its monitoring role, resulting in more long-term debt in high-disclosure 
firms. Second, we extend corporate governance studies showing that firms are granted longer 
debt maturity when they already offer better monitoring through higher-quality financial 
reporting (García-Teruel et al., 2010) or stronger external audits (El Ghoul et al., 2016). Our 
work differs, however, from these studies by addressing voluntary disclosure as a 
disciplinary device. Third, our research complements the literature on the relationship 
between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure (e.g., Awartani et al., 2016; Chau and 
Gray, 2002; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Jankensgård, 2018; Luo et al., 2006) by exploring 
the joint effect of excess control rights and voluntary disclosure on debt maturity.8 Our work 
also differs from prior studies since it focuses on ultimate ownership of the largest controlling 
shareholder rather than on its direct ownership. Fourth, to the best of our knowledge, no 
prior study investigates the interplay between excess control rights, voluntary disclosure, 
and debt maturity. Our finding in this respect adds to recent evidence (e.g., Chen et al., 2014; 
Fang et al., 2017; Hong, 2013; Morris et al., 2011) suggesting that the information environment 
of firms with concentrated control can be positively perceived by the market.  
Our study has relevant implications for both academics and practitioners. It is 
documented that, in France, listed firms have high fractions of long-term debt in their capital 
structure, while lenders face an unfavorable institutional environment.9 The information 
environment could thus be a countervailing and viable mechanism through which lenders 
circumvent any institutional inadequacies and firms benefit from more advantageous 
financing conditions. This paper provides empirical evidence that corporate disclosure is 
valuable and economically important for market participants in France, which can be 
extended to most European countries. Moreover, the study of voluntary disclosure in France 
is timely, since, in recent years, French firms have gradually adopted the provisions of the 
                                                          
8 See, Khlif et al. (2017) for an overview of the main empirical studies on the effect of ownership structure 
on voluntary disclosure. 
9 El Ghoul et al. (2016) and Zheng et al. (2012) report that France is among the European countries whose 
firms have the most long-term debt, with an average of 56.9% total debt over the period 1991–2006. This 
fraction is 53.74% for the period 1998–2013 according to Ben-Nasr et al. (2015). 
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European Transparency Directive along with the recommendations of the main French 
reports on corporate governance introducing, inter alia, the publication of several additional 
items of information in the annual report. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates and develops 
the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the main variables of the empirical 
analysis, as well as the results of the univariate analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical 
design and discusses the results of the multivariate analysis. Section 5 reports the results of 
robustness checks, additional analysis, and endogeneity tests. Section 6 summarizes the main 
findings and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
2.1. Voluntary disclosure and debt maturity 
Since the promulgation of the Transparency Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC), 
competent authorities in France have joined together in an effort to implement appropriate 
guidelines that facilitate the compliance of French public firms with this directive.10 In 
particular, many recommendations for improving voluntary disclosure in annuals reports 
have been developed by specialized organizations such as the Association française des 
entreprises privées–Mouvement des entreprises de France (Afep–Medef) and Association française de 
la gestion financière (AFG).11 The French regulatory authority Autorité des Marchés Financiers 
(AMF) enforces many of these recommendations through “implementing” provisions.12  
The accounting literature is replete with arguments expounding the merits of 
voluntary disclosure in reducing adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Indeed, 
                                                          
10 Apart of information in the annual reports, the Transparency Directive requires the publication of half-
yearly financial reports comprising condensed financial statements, as well as a narrative interim 
management statement describing the firm’s financial position and performance. The transposition of the 
revised Transparency Directive into French law was completed in December 2015. 
11 For example, a recent version (issued in 2016) of the AFG report suggests that the annual report includes 
detailed information on non-executive chairperson compensation, as well as the auditor’s special report on 
related-party transactions. It also encourages the use of a language other than French, notably the English 
language. 
12 For example, in 2008, 88.5% of SBF 120 companies complied with Afep–Medef’s recommendation to 
report detailed information on individual executive compensation in conformity with an AMF 
implementation provision (see Y. Le Galès, “Salaires: Les patrons plus transparents,” Le Figaro, November 
18, 2009). 
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increased voluntary disclosure is generally associated with decreased information 
asymmetry and the greater ability of outsiders to monitor management (Bushman and Smith, 
2001; Chung et al., 2015; Haggard et al., 2008; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012). This involves 
disclosing bad news that would warn the market of negative earnings surprises, such that 
firms can mitigate litigation costs and preserve reputation (Kasznik and Lev, 1995). 
Nondisclosure is negatively interpreted by the market, since it offers great opportunities for 
misreporting (Dhaliwal et al., 2011a). In sum, comprehensive voluntary disclosure sends a 
positive signal to the market because it reflects the efforts of insiders toward increasing the 
observability of their actions and mitigating agency problems.  
Voluntary disclosure can be especially valuable to lenders, who can use private 
information to appropriately assess a firm’s creditworthiness (Healy and Palepu, 2001), as 
well as verify and monitor corporate compliance with debt covenants (El Ghoul et al., 2016). 
A number of studies support the debt-related benefits of voluntary disclosure by showing, 
for example, that higher disclosure levels are associated with the reduced cost of capital 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2011a; Easley and O’Hara, 2004) and lower costs of debt (Mazumdar and 
Sengupta, 2005).13 With respect to debt maturity, an extensive literature documents that 
short-term debt implies lower agency costs to the extent that, under information asymmetry, 
the frequent renewal of this debt allows for the recurrent monitoring of managerial actions 
(e.g., Barclay and Clifford, 1995; Barnea et al., 1980; Myers, 1977).14 However, greater 
corporate transparency can increase lenders’ confidence in a firm and thus substitute for 
short-term debt in its monitoring role, leading to more long-term debt (Berger et al., 2005; 
Godlewski, 2015).15 
Consistent with this view, La Porta et al. (2003) and Charumilind et al. (2006) show 
that firms with close ties with banks are more likely to issue long-term debt, because bankers 
                                                          
13 Despite the potential disadvantages of disclosure such as proprietary information leakage, the disclosure 
gains resulting from obtaining financing at favorable terms generally seems to outweigh the disclosure 
costs (Verrecchia, 1983, 2001).  
14 Even though this is the dominant view in the literature, Roberts and Sufi (2009) report that, in practice, 
more than 90% of long-term loans are renegotiated before they mature—and this following the availability 
of new information on the borrower or following macroeconomic fluctuations. This finding also suggests 
that corporate debt maturity structure is influenced by factors outside the firm's control, which reinforces 
the offer side adopted by the present research. 
15 Lenders are also encouraged to grant firms long-term debt because this allows them to control the firms’ 
credit risk and increases their bargaining power, since they can seize and liquidate collateral in the event 
of default (Shleifer and Vishny, 2011). 
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can more easily obtain private information about “related firms” and use this information to 
monitor managerial investment decisions. Bharath et al. (2008) and García-Teruel et al. (2010) 
report that higher reporting quality can substitute for the monitoring role of short-maturity 
debt, allowing firms to have longer-maturity debt. Similarly, El Ghoul et al. (2016) show that 
strong external monitoring by a Big Four auditor implies more long-term debt. 
Given that an expanded disclosure policy is consistent with an improvement in the 
firm’s information and monitoring environment, the above arguments suggest that firms 
would issue more long-term debt when they have greater voluntary disclosure. Therefore, 
we formulate our first hypothesis as follows. 
H1: Firms with higher levels of voluntary disclosure have more long-term debt. 
2.2. Excess control rights, voluntary disclosure, and debt maturity 
Assuming that firms with higher voluntary disclosure are more entitled to long-
maturity debt, we investigate whether this hinges on the entrenchment of controlling 
shareholders with control rights in excess of cash-flow rights, that is, excess control rights. 
Consistent with the corporate governance literature, more excess control rights are associated 
with a higher likelihood of controlling shareholders misusing firm resources in pursuit of 
private benefits (e.g., Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010; Claessens et al., 2002; Johnson et al., 
2000).16  
Since excess control rights are a typical channel of private benefit extraction by 
controlling shareholders, corporate disclosure could represent a form of outsider protection 
that reduces the scope of these benefits (Östberg, 2006). The dissemination of high-quality 
information, in particular, increases outsiders’ ability to monitor managerial actions and 
avert any opportunistic behavior (Berglöf and Pajuste, 2005). In this respect, Morris et al. 
(2011) report that, following the Asian financial crisis, the demand for the transparency of 
firms involved in pyramid structures—where the divergence between control rights and 
cash-flow rights is ubiquitous and tunneling through related-party transactions is more 
likely—increased as a remedy for the potentially high private benefits of controlling 
shareholders in these structures. 
                                                          
16 These benefits can take different forms, such as engaging in unprofitable investments that generate 
private gains for the controlling shareholder, transferring cash and profits to other firms under that 
shareholder’s control, paying low dividends, or issuing loan guarantees using the firm’s assets.  
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In support of this view, Hong (2013) finds that the adoption of mandatory 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in dual-class firms provides an effective 
mechanism for constraining private benefits. Chung et al. (2015) show that the role of 
voluntary disclosure in mitigating agency costs associated with excessive executive 
compensation is more prominent among group-affiliated firms than among independent 
firms. In a related vein, Fang et al. (2017) show that Chinese group-affiliated firms are more 
likely to select the top 10 audit firms to improve reporting quality. The authors also report 
that group firms benefit from such strong external monitoring because they enjoy higher 
value and cheaper equity financing. This result is in line with the claim of Boubaker and 
Labégorre (2008) that the private information of firms with greater excess control rights is 
valued more highly by the market, leading to a larger analyst following.  
Lenders are particularly aware of the risk of being expropriated by controlling 
shareholders, which explains the tighter debt terms that are often imposed on firms with 
excess control rights, such as higher costs of debt (Boubakri and Ghouma, 2010) or borrowing 
costs (Lin et al., 2011). This can create a context wherein corporate disclosure serves as a valid 
signal of value to the market. In this respect, Chen et al. (2014) show that the positive effect 
of corporate transparency on debt maturity is more pronounced among family firms 
compared to other firms, because the greater transparency of family firms would be more 
valuable to outsiders as a mechanism for reducing the scope for expropriation by the 
controlling families.  
Taking all the above arguments into account, we predict that voluntary disclosure will 
be more valuable to lenders in firms with higher excess control rights because the greater 
transparency of such firms would facilitate information gathering and increase management 
monitoring to a greater extent. This matters because of higher demand for private 
information about firms in which the likelihood of expropriation is higher (Chen et al., 2014; 
Fang et al., 2017) such as firms with excess control. Therefore, assuming that the (positive) 
effect of voluntary disclosure on debt maturity reflects the disciplinary role of corporate 
disclosure, we expect this effect to be more prevalent among firms with higher levels of excess 
control rights. We thus suggest the following hypothesis. 
H2: The (positive) effect of voluntary disclosure on debt maturity is more 
pronounced among firms with higher excess control rights. 
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3. Data  
This section describes the sample selection procedure and data sources and discusses 
the construction of the voluntary disclosure indexes, as well as the choice of control variables. 
It also presents descriptive statistics and the results of the univariate analysis. 
3.1. Sample selection and data sources 
The initial sample includes all publicly listed French firms available in the Worldscope 
database for the 2007–2013 period. We end the analysis in 2013 because of the promulgation 
in 2014 of the Florange Act stipulating, in particular, that double voting is the default rule for 
any nominative listed stock that is held for at least two years (unless the one share, one vote 
principle is explicitly included in the company's bylaws). Such a provision could increase the 
separation of control and cash-flow rights in a substantial way, thus altering our analysis of the 
effect of excess control rights on corporate debt structure. Financial firms (Standard Industrial 
Classification, or SIC, codes 6000–6999) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900–4999) are 
excluded because of their specific legal and regulatory requirements, consistent with prior 
literature. Observations missing financial or governance data are also discarded from the 
sample. The screening process results in a total of 440 firms for 2,485 firm–year observations. 
Data on voluntary disclosure are manually gathered from the companies’ annual reports. 
Financial data are retrieved from the Worldscope database. 
3.2. Main variables 
3.2.1. The voluntary disclosure indexes 
To measure voluntary disclosure, we identify a subset of nonmandatory information 
items that are disclosed in firm annual reports and we construct different voluntary 
disclosure indexes. Voluntary disclosure in annuals reports is of great interest for several 
reasons. First, disclosing additional information beyond mandatory requirements reflects the 
flow of private communications from the firm, which is the primary concern for lenders 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2011b). The level of disclosure in annual reports also tends to be positively 
associated with the extent of other types of public disclosure, such as those conveyed via 
investor relations services (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Second, annual reports divulge a 
variety of financial and nonfinancial information, which allows different aspects of voluntary 
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disclosure policy to be considered, such as historical and forward-looking information, as 
well as a variety of corporate governance information.17 Third, most other reporting quality 
indicators in the literature, such as earnings management and analyst forecasts, are 
essentially accounting-based measures and are often relatively complex to set up and to 
interpret for market participants (Li, 2008).  
Interestingly, many studies use a self-constructed index to gauge general voluntary 
disclosure (e.g., Chau and Gray, 2010; Francis et al., 2008; Morris et al., 2011) or specific 
disclosures, such as those on the environment (Meng et al., 2013) or executive compensation 
(Chung et al., 2015; Melis et al., 2015). We do not use management earnings guidance as in 
most of the recent U.S. research, since that such a report (or its equivalent) does not exist in 
France.18 Moreover, disclosure indexes have the advantage of taking into account variation 
in the information flow, compared to the dummy management guidance variable. In 
addition, our self-constructed index includes, inter alia, items reflecting management 
forecasts.  
To construct our overall disclosure index OVERALL_VDI, we establish a list of 73 
items that are compiled from prior voluntary disclosure literature (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Eng 
and Mak, 2003; Meek et al., 1995). All items are checked against regulatory disclosure 
requirements to verify that they remain adapted to the French context. We hand-collect these 
items directly from the firms’ annual reports (or reference documents). An item is coded one 
if it is disclosed in the annual report, 0 if it is not, and N/A if it is not applicable to the firm. 
The variable OVERALL_VDI is measured as the sum of items coded one, divided by the 
maximum possible items for a given firm, excluding inapplicable items. 
The listed items fall into one of two significant categories, namely, governance 
information (47 items) and financial information (18 items). Correspondingly, two 
refinements of the voluntary disclosure measure are used. We construct a governance 
disclosure index GOV_VDI and a financial disclosure index FIN_VDI. The governance 
disclosure index includes information on major shareholders and managers, as well as 
information on the board of directors, directors, committees, and external auditors. The 
                                                          
17 For example, Amir and Lev (1996) show that the voluntary disclosure of nonfinancial information on 
intangible assets is markedly more value relevant to investors than financial information is. 
18 The use of a voluntary disclosure index could thus increase the comparability of our results with those 
of prior research from outside the United States. 
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financial disclosure index comprises historical, current, and forward-looking information. 
We do not consider a specific index for general information items, given their limited number 
(eight items). Relevant to our interest in information and agency problems between insiders 
and outsiders, we also construct an insider disclosure index INS_VDI that captures the extent 
of information about insiders (managers and controlling shareholders), including, inter alia, 
their ownership, votes, compensation, and personal profiles (15 items). See Appendix 1 for 
the list and categories of the items used to construct the four voluntary disclosure indexes. 
Following prior empirical studies using self-constructed disclosure indexes, we 
measure Cronbach’s (1951) alpha to assess the internal consistency of our four voluntary 
disclosure measures. Cronbach’s alpha ranges from zero to one and measures the degree to 
which correlations among the different disclosure indexes are weakened due to random 
error. We obtain an alpha of 0.77, which is an acceptable value to determine that our 
disclosure indexes record the same underlying construct and are thereby valid.19 
3.2.2. Debt maturity 
In our main regressions, the dependent variable DEBT_MATURITY is measured as 
the ratio of long-term debt to total debt, following previous research (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 
2016; Zheng et al., 2012). Alternative measures of debt maturity are used for robustness 
checks. 
3.2.3. Excess control rights of controlling shareholders 
Excess control rights gauge the wedge between the control rights and cash-flow rights 
of the ultimate controlling shareholder. We identify the ultimate controlling shareholder as 
the individual or entity owning the largest control rights stake (the proportion of direct and 
indirect voting rights) that equals or exceeds 10%.20 We thus conventionally assume that a 
shareholder who controls, directly or indirectly, at least 10% of the votes can exert effective 
control over the firm, which is consistent with very thorough studies related to 
disproportional ownership (e.g., Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999). If the firm does 
                                                          
19 There is no standard test of significance for this statistic. By comparison, Botosan (1997) finds an alpha of 
0.64 and Gul and Leung (2004) find an alpha of 0.7. 
20 The use of a 20% control level leads to qualitatively unchanged results, as shown by the results of 
robustness checks. 
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not have at least one shareholder with 10% or more of the control rights, the firm is 
considered widely held.  
To measure the excess control rights of the controlling shareholder, we first trace, year 
by year, the control chain(s) in the pyramidal structure back to the ultimate owner, 
considering the 10% control level. We collect data on the ownership and votes of the largest 
direct owner from the company’s annual report and we complete these with information on 
the ownership and votes of the largest owner of this owner and so on. We thus build the 
control chains of the pyramid structure until we reach the ultimate owner, identified as the 
largest shareholder not controlled by another shareholder at the 10% control level. The 
ultimate owner can be an individual (a family), a widely held firm, a widely held financial 
institution, employees, or miscellaneous (cooperative, charity, etc).  
We next compute the control rights and cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner 
following the literature on disproportional ownership (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and 
Lang, 2002). Control rights are computed as the sum of the weakest links of voting rights 
along each control chain. Cash-flow rights are obtained as the sum of the products of 
ownership stakes along the different control chains. The excess control rights of the 
controlling shareholder, EXCESS, are the difference between control rights and cash-flow 
rights, divided by control rights. 
3.2.4.  Control variables 
We control for a number of firm characteristics likely to affect the corporate debt 
maturity structure, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; Datta et al., 
2005; Myers, 1977; Zheng et al., 2012), as follows.21 
(i) Firm leverage (LEVERAGE) is the ratio of total debt to total assets. This variable is expected 
to be positively linked to debt maturity. Indeed, firms can face a higher risk of liquidity 
shortage when they have more leverage, making them more likely to lengthen the maturity 
of their debt.  
                                                          
21 In untabulated tests, we considered many other control variables, including the cash-flow rights of the 
ultimate owner, firm age, the return on equity, the return on assets, capital expenditure, research and 
development, accounting quality, and audit quality. We find that the results remain qualitatively 
unchanged. 
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(ii) Asset maturity (ASSET_MATURITY) is defined as the weighted average of the maturities 
of current and long-term assets, where the maturity of current assets is current assets divided 
by the cost of goods sold and the maturity of long-term assets is the ratio of gross property, 
plant, and equipment to depreciation and amortization. We expect this variable to have a 
positive impact on the use of long-term debt. Indeed, long-term debt typically matures at the 
same time as the cash flows generated from the assets that are covered by this type of debt, 
whereas the maturity of short-term debt does not commonly match the cash flow timing and 
should hence be frequently refinanced. This argument implies that the maturity matching 
principle reduces the agency cost of debt and encourages creditors to lend long term. 
(iii) The market-to-book ratio (MTB) is computed as the market value of equity divided by 
the book value of equity. It is used to proxy for the firm’s growth opportunities, following 
standard convention in the literature. This variable is expected to be negatively associated 
with debt maturity. Firms with more growth opportunities could, indeed, shorten the 
maturity of their debt to help mitigate information asymmetry and the resulting conflicts 
with debtholders over the completion of these projects.  
(iv) The performance variability (STD_ROA) is measured as the standard deviation of a firm’s 
return on assets over the previous five years. This variable gauging firm risk is expected to 
be negatively linked to debt maturity. Firms with greater performance variability—that is, 
greater unpredictability—will face higher credit risk, causing them to be more likely limited 
to short-term debt.  
(v) Abnormal earnings (ABNE) are measured as the ratio of change in earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) over the period [t, t + 1] to the 
market value of equity in year t. This variable proxies for firm quality and is expected to have 
a negative effect on debt maturity, since, consistent with the signaling hypothesis, higher-
quality firms tend to issue more short-term debt to subject themselves to more frequent 
monitoring by lenders.  
(vi) Firm size (SIZE) is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets (in thousands of 
euros). This variable is expected to be positively related to debt maturity. Because larger firms 
tend to have higher credit quality, given their higher expected cash flow, it easier for them to 
obtain more long-term debt. 
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3.3. Summary statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables in the main analysis. All the 
financial variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles to reduce the effects of 
outliers. Panel A provides descriptive statistics on variables used in the main analysis. The 
average (median) value of the general voluntary disclosure index OVERALL_VDI is 40.72% 
(43.54%), indicating the relatively high likelihood of French firms disclosing private 
information. The sampled firms have average (median) GOV_VDI, INS_VDI, and FIN_VDI 
values of, respectively, 49.71% (55.55%), 59.11% (56.25%), and 32.92% (36.63%), suggesting 
that the content of information voluntarily disclosed primarily pertains to corporate 
governance information, and to a lesser extent, to financial information. Moreover, we find 
that controlling shareholders’ excess control rights have a mean (average) of 22.29% (20.39%), 
showing that this topic is of more than theoretical interest. These values are, in addition, 
consistent with prior studies focusing on France (Boubaker and Labégorre, 2008; Boubaker et 
al., 2015). 
The results also indicate that, on average, 55.73% of total debt is long term, with a 
median value of 61.22%. This pattern of debt maturity is similar to that reported in other 
studies in the French context, such as those of Zheng et al. (2012) and Ben-Nasr et al. (2015), 
who document average ratios of long-term debt to total debt of 56.9% and 53.74%, 
respectively. The leverage ratio is 21.05% (17.91%) for the average (median) firm. The mean 
(median) value of asset maturity for our sample is 5.0437 (2.5546). We also document an 
average (median) market-to-book ratio of 1.8205 (0.6333). The performance variability and 
abnormal earnings have an average (median) of 7.03% (3.22%) and 6.92% (0.74%) The mean 
(median) natural logarithm of firm size is 14.8344 (14.1688). Overall, these results are 
consistent with the above-mentioned studies focusing on the French context. 
Panel B provides mean values of variables of interest by year. The results report that, 
overall, the extent of voluntary disclosure does not change substantially over time, despite a 
slight increase in the years after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. We also notice a decreasing 
trend in excess control rights, which may indicate a lesser presence of complex ownership 
structures over the study period. Moreover, we find that debt maturity slightly increases 
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immediately after the financial crisis but it recovers to its pre-crisis level two years 
subsequently.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 reports the results of t-test differences of the means of debt maturity by year, 
as well as over the entire period. The mean values of debt maturity for 2007–2013 are 50.49% 
and 62.60% when OVERALL_VDI is, respectively, below and above the median. The 
difference is significant at the 1% confidence level. This result holds for the year-by-year 
comparison analysis. This indicates that firms have marginally more long-term debt in their 
capital structure given high levels of voluntary disclosure compared to low levels. Similar 
results are found when using alternative voluntary disclosure variables. Thus, over the whole 
sample period, the average long-term debt figures for firms with GOV_VDI, INS_VDI, and 
FIN_VDI above the median are, respectively, 60.77%, 65.37%, and 58.08%. These values 
decrease significantly to 49.16%, 52.22%, and 58.08% when, respectively, GOV_VDI, 
INS_VDI, and FIN_VDI are below the median. This difference in debt maturity between firms 
with low and high voluntary disclosure is also significant across the years of our analysis 
(except for the variable FIN_VDI in 2007 and 2008). Our findings provide preliminary 
evidence on the association between voluntary disclosure and long-maturity debt.  
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
4. Multivariate analysis 
This section describes our baseline model specification. It also reports the results of 
the effect of voluntary disclosure on debt maturity and the role of excess control rights in this 
relation.  
4.1. Baseline model specification 
To test our research hypotheses, we estimate the following model specification: 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇_𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝐷𝐼 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 +  𝛽3 ∗ 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇_𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌 + 𝛽4 ∗
𝑀𝑇𝐵 +  𝛽5 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝑅𝑂𝐴 +  𝛽6 ∗ 𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐸 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽8(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠) +  𝛽9 ∗
 (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠) + 𝜀𝑖                                                                              Eq.(1) 
where Industry Dummies and Year Dummies are sets of year and industry fixed effects, 
respectively, included in the model to capture variations over time and across industries in 
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debt maturity and voluntary disclosure. Industries are identified using the SIC classification 
of Campbell (1996). All the other variables are described in Appendix 2. The financial 
variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles to reduce the effects of outliers. 
We follow prior literature on debt maturity (e.g., Billett, 2007; Kirch and Terra, 2012; 
El Ghoul et al., 2016) and we account for the joint determination of debt maturity and leverage 
by estimating a 2SLS regression. The fitted values of leverage are obtained from the following 
first-stage estimation of the 2SLS regression:  
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝑅𝑂𝐴 +  𝛽5 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 +   𝛽6 ∗
𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷 + 𝛽7(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠) + 𝛽8 ∗  (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠) + 𝜀𝑖      Eq.(2) 
where PPE is the ratio of net plant, property and equipment to total assets and REGULATED 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm belongs to a regulated industry (e.g., railroads, 
SIC code 4011; trucking, SIC codes 4210 and 4213; airlines, SIC code 4512; and 
telecommunications, SIC codes 4812 and 4813), and 0 otherwise. The other variables are 
described in Appendix 2. The financial variables are winsorized at the first and 99th 
percentiles. 
4.2. Effect of voluntary disclosure on debt maturity 
Table 3 reports the results from estimating the effect of voluntary disclosure on debt 
maturity structure using 2SLS regressions. Specification (1) includes the general voluntary 
disclosure index OVERALL_VDI along with the main determinants of debt maturity. The 
results show that the coefficient of OVERALL_VDI is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. This result is also economically important in that, ceteris paribus, the proportion 
of long-term debt in firms’ capital structures rises by 31.89% with a one-point increase in the 
general voluntary disclosure index. The results from specifications (2) to (4) also show that 
the coefficients of, respectively, GOV_VDI, INS_VDI, and FIN_VDI are strongly positive and 
economically significant, with proportions of long-term debt that rise by 23.07%, 12.77%, and 
10.41% with a one-point increase in the voluntary disclosure index associated with, 
respectively, corporate governance, insider, and financial information. This finding means 
that the increase of long-term debt with voluntary disclosure is greater when such a 
disclosure concerns, first, information on corporate governance, then information on insiders, 
and, lastly, financial information. This result indicates that the different types of voluntary 
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disclosure do not likely to affect lenders’ decisions to lend long term to the same degree. In 
particular, it seems that lenders are more interested in the quality of corporate governance, 
which reinforces the notion that voluntary disclosure is considered per se an effective 
monitoring and corporate governance mechanism.  
Overall, these findings support the prediction of H1, that firms access more long-term 
debt when they provide greater voluntary disclosure, which is consistent with recent 
empirical evidence that longer maturity debt is essentially the outcome of a positive 
perception of a firm’s information and monitoring environment (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 2016; 
Godlewski, 2015).  
All the control variables, except for the market-to-book ratio, are statistically 
significant and have the expected sign, consistent with prior studies in this area (e.g., Barclay 
and Clifford, 1995; Billett et al., 2007; Zheng et al., 2012). Thus, we find that higher leverage 
leads to longer debt maturity as a way to avoid liquidity risk. Asset maturity is also found to 
be positively associated with debt maturity, which is consistent with the view that firms are 
more likely to match the maturity structure of their assets and their liabilities to avoid debt 
repayment problems. The results indicate that, in contrast, debt maturity decreases with the 
volatility of the return on assets, corroborating that lenders of long-term debt tend to preclude 
risky firms. As expected, we find a negative impact of abnormal earnings on debt maturity, 
meaning that high-quality firms signal that they are better monitored through issuing short-
term debt. We also support the view that larger firms have longer debt maturity because they 
enjoy lower credit risk.22 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.3. Effect of ownership structure on the relation between voluntary disclosure and debt 
maturity 
In this section, we analyze whether and how the (positive) effect of voluntary 
disclosure on debt maturity varies with the presence of controlling shareholders with control 
rights in excess of cash-flow rights. 
                                                          
22  In an untabulated test, we further control for the financial crisis period (2007-2008) and find that the 
results remain unchanged. 
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Table 4 reports the results from the sample-splitting technique consisting in 
classifying firms into Low EXCESS or High EXCESS groups, depending on whether the 
variable EXCESS is below or above the median value of the distribution. 23  The results show 
that the coefficients of the four voluntary disclosure indexes OVERALL_VDI, GOV_VDI, 
INS_VDI, and FIN_VDI are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in the High 
EXCESS groups (specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8)). In contrast, the voluntary disclosure 
coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero across the Low EXCESS groups 
(specifications (1), (3), (5), and (7)). The magnitude of the disclosure coefficient is also higher 
in the High EXCESS groups. Our results are economically relevant, given that firms with 
extensive voluntary disclosure as proxied by OVERALL_VDI, GOV_VDI, INS_VDI, and 
FIN_VDI experience, respectively, 49.59%, 34.07, 20.61%, and 18% higher long-term debt 
when they have high excess control rights compared to when they have low excess control 
rights. In addition, these significant coefficients exceed those observed in Table 4 for the 
whole sample. We note that, overall, the results for the control variables are very similar to 
those reported before. 
In summary, our results are consistent with the prediction of H2 that high levels of 
controlling shareholders’ excess control rights strengthen the positive effect of voluntary 
disclosure on long-term debt. This finding lends credence to the contention that voluntary 
disclosure is more valuable to lenders in firms with higher excess control rights, arguably 
because greater transparency for such firms would facilitate information gathering and 
increase monitoring by the market to a greater extent. We thus complement prior recent 
evidence on the importance of corporate transparency in reducing agency problems in firms 
where the risk of wealth expropriation by controlling shareholders is already high (Chen et 
al., 2014; Chung et al., 2015). Our results also suggest that controlling shareholders could gain 
more benefits from corporate transparency—by obtaining more long-term debt—than from 
extracting private benefits of control.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
                                                          
23 We test our second hypothesis using the sample-splitting technique rather than the interaction variable 
technique to avoid multicollinearity issues stemming from the high correlations between the test variables 
and their interaction terms, especially when the interactions involve a dummy variable (e.g., El Ghoul et 
al. 2016; Guedhami et al. 2009).  
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5. Robustness checks, additional analysis, and endogeneity 
5.1. Alternative variable measures 
In Table 5, we test the robustness of the results regarding H1 (specifications (1) and 
(2)) and H2 (specifications (3)−(8)).  
First, we use the dummy measure of debt maturity, DEBT_MATURITY DUMMY, 
which equals 1 when the ratio of long-term debt to total debt exceeds 50%, and 0 otherwise 
(specification (1)). We rerun our main regression using the general voluntary disclosure index 
and find that the variable OVERALL_VDI is positive and significant at the 1% level, thus 
corroborating the positive significant effect of voluntary disclosure on debt maturity. 
Second, consistent with the work of Ben-Nasr et al. (2015), we measure debt maturity, 
DEBT_MATURITY1, as the difference between total liabilities and current liabilities, divided 
by total liabilities (specification (2)). The results indicate, again, that debt maturity is 
positively related to voluntary disclosure. 
Third, we use alternative measures of excess control rights, namely, the ratio of control 
rights to cash-flow rights (specifications (3) and (4)), the difference between control rights 
and cash-flow rights (specifications (5) and (6)), and the variable EXCESS taken at the 20% 
control level (specifications (7) and (8)). The results show that the coefficient of the voluntary 
disclosure index continues to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for the 
High EXCESS groups (specifications (4), (6), and (8)) and is indistinguishable from zero for 
the Low EXCESS groups (specifications (3) and (5)) or weakly statistically significant 
(specification (7)). Taken together, these findings corroborate our contention that high levels 
of excess control rights reinforce lenders’ reliance on voluntary disclosure, allowing high-
disclosure firms to access more long-term debt. 
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
5.2. Alternative sample compositions 
In this section, we check whether our first hypothesis is robust to alternative sample 
compositions. The results are reported in Table 6. First, we ensure that our results are not 
driven by the presence of institutional controlling shareholders, who typically have 
simultaneous holdings of significant equity positions and debt claims in the firm, consistent 
with several studies (e.g., Jiang et al., 2010). Indeed, these shareholders could want to signal 
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to the market their effective corporate disclosure by accompanying the increase in voluntary 
disclosure with an increase in long-term debt. Thus, we re-estimate our baseline specification 
by excluding firms in which the controlling shareholder is a financial institution (i.e., bank, 
insurance company, private equity, mutual fund, pension fund, real estate) or the state 
(specification (1)). The coefficient of the voluntary disclosure variable continues to be positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level, meaning that the positive disclosure effect on debt 
maturity is not affected by the influence of institutional shareholders over firm policies. 
Second, we conduct our analysis after excluding firms with no shareholders holding 
at least 10% of control rights (i.e., widely held firms) to check that our results are not due to 
the absence of agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority investors 
(specification (2)). Our main findings remain unaffected.  
Third, the presence of controlling shareholders with important cash-flow rights could 
give them greater incentives to align their interests with those of shareholders, notably by 
extending voluntary disclosure. To ensure that our results are not driven by the disclosure 
incentives of dominant shareholders with substantial cash-flow rights, we rerun our main 
regression on the sample of firms in which controlling shareholders hold relatively 
nonsubstantial cash-flow rights, that is, less than 25% (specification (3)). The results confirm 
that the voluntary disclosure effect on the maturity of debt is strongly positive, indicating 
that voluntary disclosure is a valuable monitoring device for lenders who are less likely to 
rely on other internal corporate governance mechanisms. 
Fourth, the presence of multiple large shareholders—beyond the largest—could 
reinforce management monitoring, implying lower information and agency problems, 
making transparent firms more likely to negotiate favorable debt terms. To mitigate the 
concern that our results are driven by the presence of multiple large shareholders, we 
estimate our baseline model by excluding firms with more than one controlling shareholder 
(specification (4)). The results reveal again that voluntary disclosure positively affects debt 
maturity. 
Fifth, studies such as those of Claessens et al. (2002) and Johnson et al. (2000) recognize 
that, unlike stand-alone firms, group-affiliated firms are complex and opaque structures 
where management monitoring is costly and difficult. To mitigate concerns that our results 
are due to better monitoring abilities in stand-alone firms, we limit our analysis to the sample 
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of group-affiliated firms and find that the results yield the same evidence of positive and 
significant disclosure on debt maturity (specification 5).  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
5.3. Alternative statistical approaches 
Table 7 presents the results of robustness checks to alternative statistical approaches. 
First, we rerun our baseline regression using a Tobit model (specification (1)). The resulting 
coefficient of the voluntary disclosure index OVERALL_VDI is again positive and highly 
significant at the 1% level, consistent with our main finding that the fraction of long-term 
debt in capital structure increases with the extent of a firm’s voluntary disclosure.  
Second, we rerun our model using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level (specification 
(2)). The results remain qualitatively similar to our main findings.  
Third, we estimate our model using the Fama–MacBeth procedure that estimates 
cross-sectional regressions separately for each year (specification (3)). The coefficient of 
OVERALL_VDI continues to be positive and statistically significant. We furthermore employ 
the Fama–MacBeth estimation with Newey–West standard errors (specification (4)). This 
approach accounts for serial correlation using a first-order autoregressive process (Haggard 
et al., 2008). We obtain materially similar results to those previously reported.  
Fourth, we conduct our analysis by employing a random effect estimation that takes 
into account the panel nature of the data (specification (5)). Our finding of a significant and 
positive association between voluntary disclosure and long-term debt is unchanged.  
Fifth, we perform a dynamic generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation that 
addresses any endogeneity concern by using a set of lagged variables as instruments in our 
model (specification (6)). The results show that the voluntary disclosure effect on debt 
maturity is strongly positive at the 1% statistical level, thus reinforcing the prediction of our 
first hypothesis. Our GMM model is also well specified. Indeed, the AR(2) second-order serial 
correlation test yields a p-value of 0.649, meaning that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
no second-order serial correlation. Moreover, the p-value of the J-statistic of the Hansen test 
of overidentification is 0.919, indicating that we cannot reject the hypothesis that our 
instruments are valid.  
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In summary, the results from Table 7 provide strong evidence that voluntary 
disclosure plays an important role in determining corporate debt maturity. Its impact on debt 
maturity is both economically and statistically rigorous.24 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
5.4. Additional analysis 
In additional analysis, we estimate the effect of voluntary disclosure on other mixes 
of external financing sources having different implications on agency costs. In specification 
(1) of Table 8, we report the results of estimating the effect of voluntary disclosure on the 
choice between public debt and private debt. Consistent with a number of studies (e.g., 
Diamond, 1991; Smith and Warner, 1979), it is argued that private debt has lower agency 
costs relative to public debt, due to the concentrated ownership of private debt, which 
increases lenders’ incentives to engage in costly monitoring. We find that voluntary 
disclosure is positively related to public debt, indicating that voluntary disclosure helps 
bondholders exercise effective monitoring over the firm and could thus substitute for private 
debt in its monitoring role.  
In specification (2) of Table 8, we report the results of estimating the debt–equity 
choice. It is suggested that, compared to debt, equity is less subject to the scrutiny of the 
marketplace, thus allowing for higher agency costs (Hovakimian et al. 2001; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). We find that the proportion of equity relative to debt increases with 
voluntary disclosure, suggesting that such disclosure is more valuable for equityholders in 
their investment decisions. Indeed, debt already provides debtholders with great potential 
for management monitoring, thus lowering their reliance on voluntary disclosure to reduce 
agency costs. In sum, these findings corroborate our main conclusion that capital providers 
place more weight on voluntary disclosure when their financing produces higher agency 
costs.  
We note that the control variables are roughly the same for public debt and the debt–
equity choice, i.e., leverage (LEVERAGE), tangibility of assets (TANGIBILITY), profitability 
(ROA), Market-to-book ratio (MTB), firm size (SIZE), and default risk (Z-SCORE).   The signs 
                                                          
24 We also perform a weighted least squares regression to consider the unequal influence of industries on 
our analysis given their uneven distribution over the sample. We obtain similar results to those found in 
our main analysis (not tabulated). 
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of these variables are, overall, consistent with those documented by prior literature such as 
Flannery and Rangan (2006), Hovakimian et al. (2001), and Kayhan and Titman (2007).  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
5.5. Endogeneity issues 
While corporate disclosure policy seems to affect the maturity structure of corporate 
debt, it could in turn, be affected by debt maturity. Indeed, long-term debt allows insiders to 
insulate themselves from market scrutiny for long periods, leading lenders to require more 
transparency, notably through comprehensive voluntary disclosure (Milgrom, 1981; 
Verrecchia, 1983). 
Consistent with prior accounting studies including Brown and Hillegeist (2007) 
and Dhaliwal et al., (2011b) we address this endogeneity by using instrumental variables 
to replace the proxy for voluntary disclosure with a predicted variable and employ a two-
stage least squares approach. 
In the first stage, we estimate the following regression model: 
𝐺𝐸𝑁_𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                       Eq.(3) 
where GEN_VDI is overall voluntary disclosure index, and INSTRUMENTS is a vector of 
variables that proxy for the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure. Following prior 
research, these variables are firm age, analyst following, profitability, market-to-book ratio, 
performance volatility, market concentration, firm size, equity issuance, and litigation risk. 
Their definitions are provided in Appendix 2.  
Consistent with prior studies, we use firm age (AGE) and analyst following 
(ANALYST) to proxy for the demand for information. Barton and Waymire (2004) use firm 
age to proxy for market demand for information about newer firms. AGE is proxied by the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of years since incorporation. Lang and Lundholm 
(1996) show that firms followed by more analysts provide more voluntary disclosure to 
satisfy analysts' information needs.25 ANALYST is measured by the natural logarithm of one 
plus the number of analysts following during the year. We also include return on assets 
(ROA) as a determinant for voluntary disclosure since more profitable firms are more willing 
                                                          
25 Data on analyst following are from the I/B/E/S dataset. We assign 0 for firms that do not appear in the 
database, following Boubaker and Labégorre (2008). 
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to share their good news, implying more voluntary disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). 
In addition, we control for market-to-book ratio (MTB) −as a measure for growth 
opportunities− given that growth opportunities typically increase uncertainty and 
information asymmetry, leading to greater demand for information. Following Lang and 
Lundholm (1993), we also control for performance volatility (STD_ROA) because firms 
with more volatile results are more exposed to legal action, which encourages them to 
increase their public disclosure. In addition, we introduce market concentration 
(CONCENTRATION) to the model as a proxy for proprietary costs. Studies, including 
Bamber and Cheon (1998), show that firms acting in highly concentrated markets disclose 
more information due to lower proprietary costs. This variable is measured by the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index, computed as the sum of the squared market shares based on 
sales relative to total industry sales, where industry is defined according to Campbell’s (1996) 
industry classification. We also include firm size (SIZE) because large firm may benefit from 
extensive disclosure to reduce the important contracting costs they are exposed to (Diamond, 
1985). Moreover, Lang and Lundholm (2000) show that firms tend to increase their 
transparency when raising equity to reduce information asymmetry and obtain funds at a 
lower cost. We thus control for capital issuance (ISSUANCE) by introducing a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm issues equity during the current year or the two following 
years, and 0 otherwise. Lastly, we include litigation risk (LITIGATION) since many studies 
such as Skinner (1994) show that providing more voluntary disclosure, in particular, of bad 
news reduces firms’ exposure to litigation risk. We proxy for litigation risk using a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm belongs to a high litigation industry (SIC codes 2833–2836, 
3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, 7370–7374, 8731–8734), and 0 otherwise. 
Table 9 presents the results the two-stage least squares estimation. In specification (3), 
we estimate the first-stage disclosure model, using the general voluntary disclosure index 
OVERALL_VDI as dependent variable. The results indicate that our instruments are valid 
overall, since the estimated coefficients of six of the nine variables are statistically significant 
and have the predicted sign. The Partial F- statistic in the first-stage regression (specification 
3) is of 20.2267, which is well above the commonly applied critical value of 10, meaning that 
we do not have a weak-instrument problem (Stock and Yogo,2005). 
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In specification (1), we estimate the second stage of the 2SLS procedure that uses debt 
maturity as the dependent variable and introduces the first-stage fitted values for voluntary 
disclosure. The Wu-Hausman’s test for exogeneity exhibits a p-value of 0.006, which strongly 
rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the variable of interest, i.e., voluntary disclosure, 
implying that the 2SLS estimate is preferable to the OLS estimator. The results indicate that 
the voluntary disclosure index has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, which 
corroborates our main finding of more long-maturity debt in firms with higher voluntary 
disclosure.  
In specification (2), we use a GMM-IV estimation that introduces exogenous variables 
as instruments in the moment conditions. This technique has the advantage of ensuring that 
the standard errors of the estimates are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent. The 
results are again supportive of the main findings, meaning that our conclusions are not 
driven by endogeneity issues. The GMM C statistic’s test of endogeneity has a p-value of 0.000, 
thus rejecting the hypothesis that the variable on voluntary disclosure is exogenous. The control 
variables in the 2SLS estimations have, overall, similar signs and statistical significance as 
found in the main analysis. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
6. Conclusions 
The debt contracting literature suggests that firms are better able to negotiate 
favorable debt terms when they offer a better information and monitoring environment (e.g., 
Armstrong et al., 2010; Christensen et al., 2016; Diamond, 1991). This study examines the 
effect of voluntary disclosure on debt maturity structure using a sample of 2,485 observations 
of French listed firms over 2007–2013. Our analysis starts with univariate results and 
continues with a 2SLS regression analysis that accounts for the joint determination of debt 
maturity and leverage. The results indicate that voluntary disclosure positively affects long-
term debt, a finding consistent with the notion that an expanded corporate disclosure policy 
allows for better access to long-term debt due to high-disclosure firms having lower 
information asymmetry and better observability of insider actions. 
In firms with concentrated control, controlling shareholders typically have control 
rights in excess of cash-flow rights, making them inclined to misuse firm resources in the 
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pursuit of private benefits (e.g., Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010; Claessens et al., 2002; Johnson 
et al., 2000). We thus explore the role of controlling shareholders’ excess control rights in 
shaping the relation between voluntary disclosure and debt maturity. One view suggests that 
firms with excess control rights offer a poor information environment to obfuscate the self-
serving behavior of controlling shareholders, making voluntary disclosure less valuable in 
obtaining long-term debt. An alternative view indicates that these firms exhibit greater 
corporate transparency to avoid unfavorable financing conditions, making voluntary 
disclosure more valuable to lenders. 
We provide empirical evidence of a positive association between voluntary disclosure 
and long-term debt only when the control rights of the controlling shareholders are 
significantly in excess of cash-flow rights, supporting the view that voluntary disclosure is 
more valuable when the risk of private benefit extraction by entrenched controlling 
shareholders is higher. These shareholders could thus gain greater benefits from corporate 
transparency than from extracting private benefits of control. Our main results persist when 
we specify alternative measures for debt maturity and excess control rights, as well as 
alternative sample compositions and statistical techniques. We also address endogeneity 
issues. 
Overall, our evidence implies that voluntary disclosure provides an efficient 
monitoring mechanism in firms where long-term debt could insulate firms from lender 
scrutiny for a long time. Our work also supports the findings of recent studies where better 
disclosure policies are viewed more positively by the market in environments where the risk 
of wealth expropriation by dominant shareholders is higher. 
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Appendix 1. Voluntary disclosure checklist 
 
Items of content      
A–General corporate information       
- Brief history                                                           D, E 
 
   
- Organizational structure/Chart                                                                                                  D, E  
- Description of products/services A, B, C 
 
  
 - Main markets                                           A, B, C,  
 - Market share of key products A, B, C, D, 
- Statement of general objectives A, B, C, D, E 
- Statement of financial objectives B, D, E   
- Annual report in English      
B– Information on corporate governance       
B1–Insiders (Shareholders and managers)      
- Identity of  principal shareholders B, D, E   
- Ownership of principal shareholders B, D, E   
- Votes of principal shareholders B, D, E   
- Draft resolution of shareholders’ meetings B     
- List of senior managers (not sitting on the board of directors) B, E,    
- Picture of senior managers B, E,    
- Personal profile of managers  B, E,    
- Age of senior managers B, E,    
- Number of shares owned by managers B, E, F 
 
  
- Number of votes owned by managers B, E, F 
 
  
- Basis for determining managers’ remuneration B, E, F 
 
  
- Weight assigned on managers’ performance measures B, F 
 
  
- Discussion of the decision-making process of managers 
remuneration 
B, F 
 
   
- Form of managers’ remuneration (cash, shares, etc.) B, F 
 
   
-  Information about stock option programs B, F 
 
   
B2–Other corporate governance characteristics     
- List of directors  B, E    
- Picture of directors B, E    
- Description of the role of the board  B, E    
- Significant issues addressed by the board during the year B, E    
- Frequency and dates of board meetings  B     
- Attendance of directors at board meetings B     
- Independence of directors  B     
- Personal profile of directors B, D    
- Age of directors B, D    
- Date of first appointment of directors B     
- Start of current term/renewal of directors B     
- End of current term of  directors B     
- Number of shares held by the directors B, D    
- Number of votes held by the directors B D    
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- Information about the directors dealing B, D    
- Existence of a compensation committee B     
- Role and functioning of the compensation committee B     
- Significant issues addressed by the compensation committee 
during the year 
B     
- The name of the compensation committee members B     
- Number of compensation committee meetings during the year B     
- Attendance at compensation committee meetings B     
- Existence of an audit committee B     
- Role and functioning of the audit committee B     
- Significant issues addressed by the audit committee during the 
year 
B     
- Names of the audit committee members B     
- Number of audit committee meetings during the year B     
- Attendance at audit committee meetings B     
- Reference to a code of best practices B     
- Date of first appointment of current auditors B     
- Expiration date of term of current auditors B     
- Renewal of terms of current auditors B     
- Auditors’ fees B     
C–Financial information      
- Financial statements of the past two years D, E    
- Turnover of the past two years A, B, C, D, E 
- Sales of key products D, E    
- Summary of financial data of the previous years A, B, C, 
 
D, E 
- Summary of key ratios over at least three years A, B, C, 
 
D, E 
- Dividend policy D, E   
- Earnings per share D, E    
- Financial calendar  C, 
 
D    
- Historical share prices C, D, E   
- Share price by the end of the year A, C, D, E  
- Share prices trend A, C, D, E  
-  Stock price performance in relation to stock market index A, C, D, E  
- Market capitalization  by the end of the year A, C, D, E  
- Trend of market capitalization A, C, D, E  
- Sales forecast A, B, C, D, E 
- Forecasted market share A, B, C, D, E 
- Cash flow/Turnover forecast A, B, C, D, E 
- Earnings estimates A, B, C, D, 
 
E 
A: Botasan (1997) 
B : Ali et al., (2007) 
C: Francis et al., (2007) 
D : Meek et al,. (1995) 
E : Chau and Gray (2002) 
F : Laksama (2008) 
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Appendix 2. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Voluntary disclosure variables  
OVERALL_VDI Overall voluntary disclosure index (all items) Annual 
reports and 
authors’ 
calculations 
GOV_VDI Governance voluntary disclosure index (items of corporate 
governance characteristics) 
As above 
INS_VDI Insiders’ voluntary disclosure index (items of managers and 
controlling shareholders characteristics) 
As above 
FIN_VDI Financial voluntary disclosure index (items of financial 
information) 
As above 
Excess control variables 
EXCESS Excess control rights of the controlling shareholder 
(considering the 10% control level), computed as the 
difference between the controlling shareholder’s control 
rights and cash-flow rights, divided by the controlling 
shareholder’s control rights, where (i) control rights are 
computed as the sum of the weakest links of voting rights 
along each control chain and (ii) cash-flow rights are 
measured as the sum of the products of ownership stakes 
along the different control chains 
As above 
EXCESS_RATIO A measure of excess control rights of the controlling 
shareholder, computed as the ratio of the controlling 
shareholder’s control rights to cash-flow rights 
As above 
EXCESS_DIFF A measure of excess control rights of the controlling 
shareholder, computed as the difference between the 
controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash-flow rights 
As above 
EXCESS20 Excess control rights of the controlling shareholder for the 
20% control level, computed as the difference between the 
controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash-flow rights, 
divided by the controlling shareholder’s control rights 
As above 
Main financial variables 
DEBT_MATURITY  Debt maturity, computed as the ratio of long-term debt to 
total debt 
Worldscope 
and authors’ 
calculations 
LEVERAGE  Firm leverage, computed as the ratio of total debt to total 
assets 
As above 
ASSET_MATURIT
Y  
Asset maturity, measured as the weighted average of the 
maturities of current and long-term assets, where the 
maturity of current assets is current assets divided by the 
cost of goods sold and the maturity of long-term assets is the 
ratio of gross plant, property and equipment to depreciation 
and amortization 
As above 
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MTB  Growth opportunities measured by market-to-book ratio, 
computed as the market value of equity divided by the book 
value of equity 
As above 
STD_ROA  Performance variability, computed as the standard deviation 
of a firm's return on assets over the previous five years 
As above 
ABNE  Firm abnormal earnings, computed as the change in EBITDA 
from year t to year t + 1, divided by the market value of 
equity in year t 
As above 
SIZE  Firm size computed as the natural logarithm of total assets 
(in thousands of euros) 
As above 
Additional variables  
DEBT_MATURITY 
DUMMY  
A dummy measure of debt maturity that equals 1 when the 
the ratio of long-term debt to total debt exceeds 50%, and 0 
otherwise  
As above 
DEBT_MATURITY
1 
A measure of debt maturity that is the difference between 
total liabilities and current liabilities, divided by total 
liabilities 
As above 
PPE  Ratio of net plant, property and equipment to total assets As above 
ROA  Profitability, measured as return on assets  As above 
REGULATED A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm belongs to a 
regulated industry, and 0 otherwise, where regulated 
industries comprise sectors such as railroads (SIC code 4011), 
trucking (SIC codes 4210, 4213), airlines (SIC code 4512), and 
telecommunications (SIC codes 4812, 4813) 
As above 
AGE  Firm age, measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of year since incorporation 
As above 
CONCENTRATION  Market concentration, proxied by the Herfindahl–Hirschman 
index, computed as the sum of the squared market shares 
based on sales relative to total industry sales, where industry 
is defined according to Campbell’s (1996) industry 
classification 
As above 
ISSUANCE  Equity issuance, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm 
issues equity during the current year or the two following 
years, and 0 otherwise 
As above 
LITIGATION A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm belongs to a high 
litigation industry (SIC codes 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–
3674, 5200–5961, 7370–7374, 8731–8734), and 0 otherwise 
As above 
TANGIBILITY Ratio of net plant, property and equipment to total assets As above 
Z_SCORE  Altman's (1968) Z-score, calculated as follows: (1.2*working 
capital + 1.4*retained earnings + 3.3*earnings before interest 
and taxes + 0.999*sales)/total assets + 0.6*(market value of 
equity/book value of debt) 
As above 
 
Equity to debt Ratio of equity to total debt As above 
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ANALYST  Number of analysts following a firm, computed as the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts 
following during the year 
 I/B/E/S 
dataset 
Public debt Ratio of public debt to total debt Capital IQ 
dataset 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Variables in the main analysis 
 
Variable 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum 
 
25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
Maximum  
OVERALL_VDI 0.4072 0.1967 0 0.2656 0.4354 0.5593 0.7722 
GOV_VDI 0.4971 0.1607 0 0.4444 0.5555 0.5555 0.8888 
INS_VDI 0.5911 0.2469 0 0.4375 0.5625 0.6875 0.9112 
FIN-VDI 0.3292 0.1854 0 0.1831 0.3663 0.4273 0.7792 
EXCESS 0.2229 0.2177 0 0.0146 0.2039 0.3447 0.9585 
DEBT_MATURITY 0.5573 0.3036 0 0.3392 0.6122 0.7844 0.9858 
LEVERAGE 0.2105 0.1757 0 0.0735 0.1791 0.3045 0.9121 
ASSET_MATURITY 5.0437 5.3819 0 0.6843 2.5546 8.4136 18.2011 
MTB 1.8205 2.65482 0.0308 0.3338 0.6333 1.5470 7.5362 
STD_ROA 0.0703 0.0980 0 0.0154 0.0322 0.0742 0.3921 
ABNE 0.0692 0.1530 -0.0999 -0.0278 0.0074 0.0869 0.452 
SIZE 14.8344 4.0512 7.1561 11.209 14.1688 18.0128 26.2605 
Panel B: Mean of variables of interest by year 
Variable 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
OVERALL_VDI 0.3903 0.3909 0.4121 0.4122 0.4138 0.4147 0.4162 
GOV_VDI 0.4960 0.4969 0.4979 0.5001 0.4939 0.4962 0.4989 
INS_VDI 0.5866 0.5877 0.5906 0.5933 0.5917 0.5924 0.5967 
FIN-VDI 0.3187 0.3199 0.3296 0.3300 0.3322 0.3349 0.3394 
EXCESS 0.2324 0.2276 0.2275 0.2250 0.2209 0.2149 0.2091 
DEBT_MATURITY 0.5560 0.5538 0.5609 0.5720 0.5487 0.5547 0.5544 
This table reports descriptive statistics. Panel A describes the variables used in our main analysis. 
Panel B provide the mean of variables of interest by year. The sample comprises 2,485 firm–year 
observations representing 440 French listed firms from 2007 to 2013. All the variables in the table are 
defined in Appendix 2. 
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Table 2 
Univariate tests for differences in debt maturity 
 
 Year 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
2007-
2013 
Variable  Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
OVERALL_VDI Below median 0.5032 0.5027 0.5068 0.5080 0.4922 0.5095 0.5135 0.5049 
Above median 0.6447 0.6381 0.6219 0.6450 0.6170 0.6094 0.6057 0.6260 
t-Test  -4.6514a -4.4189a -3.7953a -4.5196a -3.7809a -2.8826a -3.9286a -10.0433a 
GOV_VDI Below median 0.4884 0.4961 0.4967 0.5100 0.4955 0.4991 0.4941 0.4969 
Above median 0.6156 0.6034 0.6130 0.6200 0.5964 0.6017 0.6018 0.6077 
t-Test -4.2957a -3.5681a -3.8188a -3.5668a -3.0428a -2.9654a -3.0394a -9.2124a 
INS_VDI Below median 0.5286 0.5283 0.5373 0.5318 0.5220 0.5177 0.4784 0.5222 
Above median 0.6773 0.6597 0.6438 0.7000 0.6238 0.6393 0.6390 0.6537 
t-Test -3.8840a -3.4644a -2.8946a -4.6147a -2.650 7a -3.0568a -4.0890a -9.1591a 
FIN_VDI Below median 0.5471 0.5301 0.5252 0.5338 0.5180 0.4985 0.4747 0.5197 
Above median 0.5641 0.5746 0.5925 0.6012 0.5749 0.5941 0.5645 0.5808 
 t-Test -0.5619 -1.4615 -2.1904b -2.1745b -1.7005c -2.7616a -2.5275b -5.0283 a 
This table reports the results of pairwise comparisons of the means of debt maturity for groups of firms with a voluntary 
disclosure index below and above its median value, respectively, by year and for the entire period, using t-tests of the 
means. The sample comprises 2,485 firm–year observations representing 440 French listed firms over the period 2007–2013. 
All the variables in the table are defined in Appendix 2. The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The p-values of the t-test and median tests of equality are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
Voluntary disclosure and debt maturity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OVERALL_VDI 0.3189 
(5.68)a 
   
GOV_VDI  0.2307 
(5.37)a 
  
INS_VDI   0.1277 
(5.20)a 
 
FIN_VDI    0.1041 
(4.42)a 
LEVERAGE 0.6113 
(3.20)a 
0.6002 
(3.15)a 
0.5693 
(2.97)a 
0.5464 
(2.83)a 
ASSET_MATURITY 0.0031  
(2.04)b  
0.0032  
(2.07)b 
0.0034  
(2.21)b 
0.0031  
(2.07)b 
MTB -0.0031 
(-1.18) 
-0.0031 
(-1.21) 
-0.0038 
(-1.45) 
-0.0033 
(-1.28) 
STD_ROA -0.1650  
(-2.76)a 
-0.1614  
(-2.70)a 
-0.1721  
(-2.89)a 
-0.1691  
(-2.84)a 
ABNE -0.1445  
(-2.86)a 
-0.1458  
(-2.89)a 
-0.1455  
(-2.89)a 
-0.1468  
(-2.92)a 
SIZE 0.0228  
(6.61)a 
0.0252  
(7.73)a 
0.0322  
(9.90)a 
0.03165  
(9.74)a 
Constant 0.0697  
(0.81) 
0.0653  
(0.76) 
0.0596  
(0.69) 
0.0767  
(0.89) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,485 2,485 2,485 2,485 
R² 12.56% 12.73% 13.01% 13.04% 
This table reports the results from a 2SLS estimation of the effect of voluntary disclosure on debt 
maturity. In all specifications, the dependent variable is debt maturity, DEBT_MATURITY, 
computed as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. The sample comprises 2,485 firm–year 
observations representing 440 French listed firms over the period 2007–2013. All the variables 
in the table are defined in Appendix 2. Year dummies and industry dummies following 
Campbell’s (1996) classification are included in all the regressions. The z-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Excess control rights, voluntary disclosure, and debt maturity 
 
 
Variable 
Low 
EXCESS 
(1) 
High 
EXCESS 
(2) 
Low 
EXCESS 
(3) 
High 
EXCESS 
(4) 
Low 
EXCESS 
(5) 
High 
EXCESS 
(6) 
Low 
EXCESS 
(7) 
High 
EXCESS 
(8) 
OVERALL_VDI 0.0956 
(0.99) 
0.4959 
(6.27)a 
      
GOV_VDI   0.0853 
(1.12) 
0.3407 
(5.99)a 
    
INS_VDI     0.0113 
(0.31) 
0.2061 
(5.69)a 
  
FIN_VDI       0.0037 
(0.11)  
0.1800 
(5.28)a 
LEVERAGE 0.6463 
(1.93)c 
0.7521 
(3.06)a 
0.6613 
(1.98)b 
0.7084 
(2.93)a 
0.6478 
(1.97)b 
0.5746 
(2.37)b 
0.6436 
(1.92)c 
0.5492 
(2.28)b 
ASSET_MATURITY 0.0050 
(2.53)b 
-0.0007  
(-0.31)  
0.0051 
(2.51)b 
-0.0007  
(-0.28)  
0.0050 
(2.53)b 
0.0003 
(0.15)  
0.0050 
(2.52)b 
-0.0000  
(-0.03)  
MTB 0.0054 
(1.40) 
-0.0102 
(-2.83)b 
0.0053 
(1.39) 
-0.0101 
(-2.81)b 
0.0052 
(1.34) 
-0.0100 
(-2.82)b 
0.0053 
(1.38) 
-0.0097 
(-2.74)b 
STD_ROA -0.2849  
(-3.42)a 
-0.0343  
(-0.40) 
-0.2814  
(-3.37)a 
-0.0375  
(-0.43) 
-0.2859  
(-3.41)a 
-0.0945  
(-1.10) 
-0.2881  
(-3.44)a 
-0.0839  
(-0.98) 
ABNE -0.1286  
(-1.81)c 
-0.1811  
(-2.45)b 
-0.1308  
(-1.85)c 
-0.1805  
(-2.44)b 
-0.1310  
(-1.88)c 
-0.1709  
(-2.33)b 
-0.1309  
(-1.87)c 
-0.1759  
(-2.41)b 
SIZE 0.0271 
(5.64)a 
0.0184 
(3.00)a 
0.0273 
(5.85)a 
0.0241 
(4.33)a 
0.0292 
(6.77)a 
0.0379 
(7.18)a 
0.0292 
(6.77)a 
0.0365 
(6.97)a 
Constant 0.0969 
(0.94)  
-0.1248  
(-1.85)c 
0.0900 
(0.88)  
-0.1324  
(-1.98)b 
0.1138 
(1.08)  
-0.1834  
(-2.74)b 
0.1178  
(1.12)  
-0.1487  
(-2.22)b 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,246 1,239 1,246 1,239 1,246 1,239 1,246 1,239 
R² 10.69% 15.54% 10.45% 16.21% 10.56% 18.38% 10.64% 18.27% 
This table reports the results from the 2SLS estimation of the effect of excess control rights on the 
relation between voluntary disclosure and debt maturity using the sample-splitting technique. The 
groups Low EXCESS and High EXCESS include firms where the excess control rights of the 
controlling shareholder are below and above the median value, respectively. In all specifications, the 
dependent variable is debt maturity, DEBT_MATURITY, computed as the ratio of long-term debt to 
total debt. The full sample comprises 2,485 firm–year observations representing 440 French listed 
firms over the period 2007–2013. All the variables in the table are defined in Appendix 2. Year 
dummies and industry dummies following Campbell’s (1996) classification are included in all the 
regressions. The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Robustness checks: Alternative variable measures  
 
 Debt 
maturity: 
DEBT_ 
MATURITY 
DUMMY 
(1) 
Debt 
maturity: 
DEBT_ 
MATURITY1 
(2) 
Excess control = 
EXCESS_RATIO 
Excess control = 
EXCESS_DIFF 
Excess control = 
EXCESS20 
 
 
Variable 
Low 
 (3) 
High 
(4) 
Low 
(5) 
High 
(6) 
Low (7) High 
(8) 
OVERALL_VDI 0.3658 
(3.93)a 
0.2241 
(6.88)a 
0.1180 
(1.22)  
0.5229 
(6.83)a 
0.0391 
(0.41)  
0.5139 
(6.66)a 
0.1371 
(1.86)c 
0.4746 
(6.29)a 
LEVERAGE 1.1187 
(3.53)a 
0.5223 
(3.13)a 
0.6472 
(1.73)c 
0.6400 
(3.17)a 
0.6589 
(2.19)b 
0.8631 
(3.15)a 
0.6718 
(1.86)c 
0.5932 
(3.00)a 
ASSET_MATURITY 0.0037  
(1.47)  
0.0048  
(4.65)a 
0.0020 
(0.93)  
0.0039  
(1.77)c 
0.0027 
(1.30) 
0.0004 
(0.16) 
0.0029 
(1.27) 
0.0023 
(0.11) 
MTB -0.0048 
(-1.11) 
-0.0074 
(-1.33) 
-0.0031 
(-0.86) 
-0.0044 
(-1.14) 
-0.0035 
(-0.98) 
-0.0015 
(-0.38) 
0.0044 
(1.19) 
-0.0097 
(-2.64)b 
STD_ROA -0.1801  
(-1.82)c 
-0.1003  
(-3.06)a 
-0.2533  
(-2.98)a 
-0.0622  
(-0.73) 
-0.2444  
(-3.01)a 
-0.0699  
(-0.77) 
-0.2812  
(-3.34)a 
-0.0365  
(-0.43) 
ABNE -0.3427  
(-4.09)a 
-0.0629  
(-2.00)b 
-0.1505  
(-1.88)c 
-0.1356  
(-2.01)b 
-0.1236  
(-1.81)c 
-0.1932  
(-2.51)b 
-0.1385  
(-1.78)c 
-0.1362  
(-2.03)b 
SIZE 0.0324 
 (5.65)a 
0.0034  
(1.80)c 
0.0198  
(3.88)a 
0.0228 
(4.36)a 
0.0276 
(6.18)a 
0.0130 
(1.92)b 
0.02445 
(4.76)a 
0.0224 
(4.54)a 
Constant -0.1215  
(0.85)   
-0.0295  
(-0.61)  
0.2142 
(2.03)b 
-0.1520 
(-2.30)b 
0.1578 
(1.63)  
-0.1374 
(-1.93)c 
0.1232 
(1.17)  
-0.1057 
(-1.63) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
2,485 2,485 1,237 1,248 1,247 1,238 1,234 1,251 
R² 4.84% 35.52% 8.27% 18.68% 16.65% 5.51% 10.36% 17.84% 
This table reports the results from a 2SLS estimation using alternative proxies for debt maturity (two first 
specifications) and excess control rights (last six specifications). In specification (1), the dependent variable is 
DEBT_MATURITY DUMMY, a dummy that equals 1 when the ratio of long-term debt to total debt exceeds 50%, 
and 0 otherwise. In specification (2), the dependent variable is DEBT_MATURITY1, measured as the difference 
between total liabilities and current liabilities, divided by total liabilities. In specifications (3) to (8), the dependent 
variable is DEBT_MATURITY, computed as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. The low- and high-excess 
control groups include firms where the excess control rights of the controlling shareholder are below and above 
the median value, respectively. The variable EXCESS_RATIO is the ratio of the controlling shareholder’s control 
rights to cash-flow rights; EXCESS_DIFF is the difference between the controlling shareholder’s control rights 
and cash-flow rights; and EXCESS20 is the excess control rights of the controlling shareholder, considering the 
20% control level, computed as the difference between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash-flow 
rights, divided by the controlling shareholder’s control rights. The full sample comprises 2,485 firm–year 
observations representing 440 French listed firms over the period 2007–2013. The other variables in the table are 
defined in Appendix 2. Year dummies and industry dummies following Campbell’s (1996) classification are 
included in all the regressions. The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts a, b, and c denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Robustness checks: Alternative sample compositions 
 
 
 
Variable 
Excluding 
firms with 
institutional 
control (1) 
Excluding 
widely held 
firms 
(2) 
Low cash- 
flow rights 
only (3) 
Excluding firms 
with multiple 
large 
shareholders (4) 
Excluding 
group-
affiliated 
firms (5) 
OVERALL_VDI 0.3054 
(5.18)a 
0.3297 
(5.62)a 
0.50006 
(5.44)a 
0.4704 
(4.18)a 
0.3510 
(5.60)a 
LEVERAGE 0.6392 
(3.08)a 
0.6786 
(3.66)b 
1.0374 
(4.59)a 
1.3149 
(2.67)b 
0.5348 
(2.11)b 
ASSET_MATURITY 0.0038 
(2.33)b 
0.0027 
(1.69)c 
0.0009 
(0.42) 
0.0053 
(2.04)b 
0.0042 
(2.16)b 
MTB -0.0029 
(-1.06) 
-0.0020 
(-0.70) 
0.0015 
(0.38) 
0.0162 
(2.39)b 
-0.0006 
(-0.18) 
STD_ROA -0.1824 
(-2.90)a 
-0.1165 
(-1.79)c 
-0.2135 
(-2.30)b 
-0.3600 
(-2.91)a 
-0.1204 
(-1.74)c 
ABNE -0.1375 
(-2.57)b 
-0.1320 
(-2.48)b 
-0.1912 
(-2.82)b 
-0.2225 
(-1.59) 
-0.1555 
(-2.65)b 
SIZE 0.0238 
(6.52)a 
0.0220 
(5.37)a 
0.0190 
(3.67)a 
0.0228 
(2.92) a 
0.0222 
(4.79)a 
Constant 0.0539 
(0.62) 
0.0543 
(-0.62) 
-0.0115 
(-0.11) 
-0.01858 
(-1.29) 
-0.0027 
(-0.02) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,279 2,043 1,234 606 1785 
R² 13.02% 11.99% 11.86% 9.58% 12.40% 
This table reports the results from a 2SLS estimation of the effect of voluntary disclosure on debt maturity 
using different sample compositions. In specification (1), firms having an institutional controlling 
shareholder are excluded from the sample of 4,285 firm–year observations. In specification (2), widely held 
firms (i.e., without a controlling shareholder when considering the 10% control level) are excluded from the 
analysis. In specification (3), only firms where the controlling shareholder has low cash-flow rights (i.e., less 
than 25%) are included. In specification (4), the results are obtained after excluding firms with more than one 
controlling shareholder (considering the 10% control level). In specification (5), we replicate our results after 
discarding group-affiliated firms. In all specifications, the dependent variable is debt maturity, 
DEBT_MATURITY, computed as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. The full sample comprises 2,485 
firm–year observations representing 440 French listed firms over the period 2007–2013. All the variables in 
the table are defined in Appendix 2. Year dummies and industry dummies following Campbell’s (1996) 
classification are included in all the regressions. The z-statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts 
a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
45 
 
Table 7 
Robustness checks: Alternative statistical techniques 
                          
 
  
 
 
Variable 
Tobit  
 
(1) 
OLS 
clustering by 
firm (2) 
Fama–
MacBeth  
(3) 
Fama–
MacBeth 
with Newey–
West (4) 
Random 
effect  
(5) 
System 
GMM (6) 
LAG OVERALL_VDI      0.0963 
(10.31)a 
OVERALL_VDI 0.3799 
(6.50)a 
0.3401 
(3.44)a 
0.4107 
(13.84)a 
0.4107 
(15.12)a 
0.1833 
(2.34)b 
0.3225 
(5.30)a 
LEVERAGE 0.3536 
(9.35)a 
0.2995 
(4.47)a 
0.2798 
(7.85)a 
0.2798 
(6.98)a 
0.2850 
(6.04)a 
0.2603 
(5.19)a 
0.000 
ASSET_MATURITY 0.0049 
(3.90)a 
0.0047  
(2.51)b 
0.0038 
(6.19)a 
0.0038  
(6.42)a 
0.0023 
(1.41) 
0.0031  
(2.25)b 
MTB -0.0041 
(-1.49) 
-0.0024 
(-0.73) 
-0.0033 
(-1.29) 
-0.0033 
(-1.21) 
0.0021 
(1.01) 
0.0002 
(2.44)b 
STD_ROA -0.1857  
(-2.91)a 
-0.1623  
(-2.15)b 
-0.1686  
(-3.21)b 
-0.1686  
(-3.25)b 
-0.1276  
(-2.48)b 
-0.1484  
(-2.97)a 
ABNE -0.0883  
(-2.01)b 
-0.0966  
(-2.28)b 
-0.1281  
(-3.13)b 
-0.1281  
(-3.33)b 
-0.0414  
(-1.30) 
-0.0513  
(-1.80)c 
SIZE 0.0272 
(7.85)c 
0.0247  
(4.17)a 
0.0211 
(11.47)a 
0.0211  
(14.97)a 
0.0335 
(6.53)a 
0. 0253  
(5.62)a 
Constant 0. 0150 
(0.16) 
0.0728  
(-0.98) 
-0.0015  
(-0.04) 
-0.0015 
 (-0.03) 
0.0675 
(0.40) 
-0.0014  
 (-0.03) 
Year dummies Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
2,485 2,485 2,485 2,485 2,485 2,045 
Pseudo-R² 23.34%      AR(1) 
0.000 
R²  15.26%   19.16% AR(2)  
0.649 
Average R²   14.65% 14.65%  Hansen 
test 0.919 
This table reports the results from a 2SLS estimation of the effect of voluntary disclosure on debt maturity 
using different statistical techniques. In all specifications, the dependent variable is debt maturity, 
DEBT_MATURITY, computed as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. All the variables in the table 
are defined in Appendix 2. Year dummies are included in specifications (1), (2), (5), and (6). Industry 
dummies following Campbell’s (1996) classification are included in all the regressions. The statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
46 
 
Table 8 
Additional analysis 
 
  
 Public debt/private debt 
(1) 
Equity/debt 
(2) 
OVERALL_VDI 0.1714 
(2.99)a 
0.6681 
(2.43)b 
LEVERAGE -0.1461 
(3.29)a 
-5.4502 
(-23.94)a 
TANGIBILITY -0.0672 
(-2.42)b 
-0.0481 
(-1.84)c 
ROA 0.3984 
(1.53) 
-37.472 
(-17.52)a 
MTB -0.0020 
(-0.45) 
0.1899 
(8.13)a 
SIZE 0.0606 
(17.33)a 
-0.4669 
(-2.75)a 
Z_SCORE -0.03889 
(-1.76)c 
3.7473 
(21.05)a 
Constant -0.3055 
(-3.34)a 
0.6364 
(1.47) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,111 2,485 
Adjusted-R² 21.52% 59.73% 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions estimating the effect of voluntary 
disclosure on different types of external financing. In specification (1), the dependent 
variable is the ratio of public debt to total debt. In specification (2), the dependent 
variable is the ratio of equity to debt; TANGIBILITY is the ratio of net  plant, property 
and equipment to total assets; ROA is profitability, measured as return on assets; 
Z_SCORE is Altman's (1968) Z-score, calculated as (1.2*working capital + 1.4*retained 
earnings + 3.3*earnings before interest and taxes + 0.999*sales)/total assets + 
0.6*(market value of equity/book value of debt). All the variables in the table are 
defined in Appendix 2. Year dummies and industry dummies following Campbell’s 
(1996) classification are included in all the regressions. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 
Endogeneity issues    
 
 
Second-stage 
regression 
(1) 
Second-stage 
GMM 
(2) 
 First-stage 
regression 
(3) 
Variable    Variable  
OVERALL_VDI 0.4989 
(2.76)b 
0.4771 
(2.85)b 
 AGE -0.0087 
(-3.53)a 
LEVSERAGE 0.4549 
(2.79)b 
0.6778 
(4.33)a 
 ANALYST 0.0500 
(14.47)a 
ASSET_MATURITY 0.0042  
(2.86)b 
0.0033  
(2.28)b 
 ROA 0.0008 
(0.11) 
MTB -0.0030  
(-1.15) 
-0.0041  
(-1.45) 
 MTB 0.0007  
(1.87)c 
STD_ROA -0.1605  
(-2.71)b 
-0.1409  
(-2.39)b 
 STD_ROA -0.0262 
(-2.01)b 
ABNE -0.1132 
 (-2.33)b 
-0.1553 
 (-3.14)a 
 CONCENTRATION -0.0003  
(-2.18)b 
SIZE 0.0190  
(3.28)a 
0.0172 
 (3.08)a 
 SIZE 0.0124 
(7.75)a 
    ISSUANCE 0.0048 
(0.61) 
    LITIGATION 0.0105 
(0.21) 
Constant 0.0415  
(0.46)  
0.0471 (0.48)   Constant  0.2898 
(9.07)a 
Year dummies Yes Yes   Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes   Yes 
Number of observations 2,485 2,485   2,485 
Adjusted-R² 14.25% 10.89%   34.96% 
Wu-Hausman  p-value 0.006   Partial F-statistic 20.2267 
GMM C statistic  p-value 0.000    
This table reports the results from 2SLS regressions considering voluntary disclosure as 
endogenous. In specifications (1) and (2), the dependent variable is debt maturity, 
DEBT_MATURITY, computed as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. The results of the first 
stage of the 2SLS regression (with voluntary disclosure as the dependent variable) are reported in 
specification (3). The full sample comprises 2,485 firm–year observations representing 440 French 
listed firms over the period 2007–2013. All the variables in the table are defined in Appendix 2. Year 
dummies and industry dummies following Campbell’s (1996) classification are included in all the 
regressions. The statistics are reported in parentheses. The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
